Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs
Volume 7
Issue 3 Symposium Issue
April 2020

Autonomous Systems & International Norms
Charles Dunlap
Richard Jordan
Elsa Kania
Michael Klare

Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia
Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade
Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons

ISSN: 2168-7951
Recommended Citation
Charles Dunlap, Richard Jordan, Elsa Kania, and Michael Klare, Autonomous Systems & International
Norms, 7 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT'L AFF. 106 (2020).
Available at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/vol7/iss3/4

The Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs is a joint publication of Penn State’s School of Law and
School of International Affairs.

Penn State
Journal of Law & International Affairs
2020

SYMPOSIUM ISSUE

AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS &
INTERNATIONAL NORMS
Moderator: Tiyanjana Maluwa
Panelists: Charles Dunlap, Richard Jordan, Elsa Kania, and Michael Klare
Tiya Maluwa:

Good morning. My name is Tiya. Tiya Maluwa,
and I’m going to be moderating this panel. This
panel is going to focus on Autonomous
Systems and International Norms. We have
four panelists, Elsa Kania is joining us from the
West Coast. Elsa is on the West Coast, she
couldn’t be with us in person, but with us here
on my left is a Dr. Michael Klare who is a
secretary of the Arms Control Association
Board and a former professor, emeritus
professor from Hampshire College.
Next to him is Charlie Dunlap. Charlie is
professor of the Practice of Law at Duke Law
School, and he is also the executive director of
the Center of Law, Ethics and National
Security. Farthest left is Professor Jordan.
Richard Jordan is professor of Political Science
at Baylor in Waco, Texas. They’re going to
address us in this order, but I thought that we
should start with Elsa Kania from the West
Coast where we have her on the line just in case
the technology fails. We hope not.
We have agreed that each presenter will do no
more than 10 minutes, because we want to try
and leave as much time as possible for Q&A at
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the end. Yeah. I’m just advised that maybe the
best way to do it is to have the panelists here
go and then Elsa will come at the end, while
they sort out the connection.
Michael Klare:

As we look into the future of war, we find that
the U.S. Air Force intends to send fighter
planes into combat accompanied by groups of
unmanned aircraft designed to attack enemy
radars and air defense systems. The Army plans
to send its troops into combat backed by
unmanned caravans of supply systems and
fighting vehicles. As current technology
evolves, these unmanned systems–and, by the
way, the military uses the term “unmanned,”
and I will continue to do that, but some
analysts say we should call them “uninhabited”
or “uncrewed,” to suggest gender neutrality–
will be capable of operating in swarms,
identifying targets for attack and, in the
absence of secure communication links from
their human overseers, to make strike decisions
on their own.
These
developments
pose
significant
challenges to international law and governance.
Most obviously they raise questions regarding
combat commanders’ ability to adhere to the
laws of war and international humanitarian law,
(and this came up in the earlier panel).
Generally speaking, these laws require that
parties to war be capable of distinguishing
between armed combatants and civilian
noncombatants, and to spare the latter as much
as possible from the consequences of fighting.
Many analysts believe that fully autonomous
weapon systems will never be capable of
exercising such judgment and so should be
banned.
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But concerns have also emerged over the
implications for nuclear stability of deploying
autonomous weapons. Many analysts worry
that the introduction of these systems will
increase the risk of accidental or unintended
escalation from conventional to nuclear
warfare, or will invite the adoption of first
strike nuclear war plans, greatly increasing the
potential for early nuclear weapons use in a
crisis. It is these concerns that I want to address
in my comments. For, as I see it, in a world of
competing great powers armed with nuclear
weapons, the most urgent task of international
governance has to be to prevent the escalation
of war across the nuclear firebreak, as the
survival of human civilization cannot be
guaranteed once that firebreak is crossed.
Brian this morning described himself as a
futurist. I’d love to hear his estimate of the
potential for nuclear war in the future. Five
years ago, I would’ve said it’s close to zero.
Now I say it’s hovering towards 50%, and I
wish we could discuss that. But I think we have
to begin with the observation that the
development and deployment of the
autonomous weapons is only part of the larger
trends in world affairs involving increased
competition among the great powers,
especially Russia and China and the U.S.,
combined with the greater inclination to
consider the employment of nuclear weapons
in future great power engagements.
This represents a significant shift from recent
years, in which counter-terrorism, rather than
great power competition, was viewed as the
main current international security affairs and
the use of nuclear weapons was considered a
108
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very distant possibility. Today, by contrast,
great power competition and conflict has been
designated by the U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD) as the principle threat to U.S. security,
and in this new threat environment, nuclear
weapons have been accorded increased
salience in U.S. military doctrine–and I believe
the same thing is true of Russian and Chinese,
or certainly Russian military doctrine. At the
same time, the great powers, led by the United
States under the Trump administration, have
backed away from the arms control
architecture that has constrained nuclear
weapons developments in past decades.
In consonance with this altered international
environment, the major powers have taken
numerous steps to enhance their nuclear and
conventional military capabilities, and to place
themselves in a more combat-ready posture.
This has entailed, among other things,
increased spending on a wide variety of
conventional and nuclear weapons and the
deployment of additional combat forces in
potential combat zones, such as the Baltic Sea
region and the Black Sea region in Europe, and
the South China Sea in the Asia Pacific. If we
look at the nuclear arena, I don’t have time to
go at length in this, we see the modernization
of the nuclear arsenals of the U.S., Russia, and
China, and we see the acquisition of low-yield
nuclear weapons by the U.S. and Russia. We
also see renewed interest by the United States
in the development of missile defenses, and we
see the development of conventional or dualuse missiles with hypersonic velocities that
could be used in strikes on enemy command,
control, and communications facilities, and
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other high-value systems deemed essential to
the prosecution of modern war.
Michael Klare:

These developments, troubling as they are, are
being accompanied by a shifting attitude
towards the use of nuclear weapons. During the
Cold War period, of course, nuclear weapons
were part of military strategy and weapons
were deployed for that purpose in Europe and
elsewhere. After the Cold War, these battlefield
nuclear weapons were largely removed from
deployment and nuclear weapons were thought
of being used solely for the purpose of
deterrence of a first strike by an enemy power.
But more recently, that has shifted again
toward a more Cold War-like environment in
which nuclear weapons are being seen as
potentially usable instruments of war by Russia
and now by the United States, and under the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) adopted by the
Trump administration a year ago, the DoD
envisions more uses for nuclear weapons. For
example, and I highlight this, the NPR
envisions a nuclear response to attacks on the
nuclear command and control systems of the
U.S. and its allies. The accelerated development
of autonomous weapon systems by the U.S.
and other countries has to be seen in this light.
The Pentagon’s stated intent in developing
autonomous weapons is, of course, to provide
combat commanders with additional tools to
identify, track and engage enemy forces, while
minimizing the risk to U.S. military personnel.
Autonomous weapons, it believes, provide
various advantages in performing these
functions as they’re highly capable in tracking
and identifying targets. They’re also
expendable. They don’t carry humans who we
110
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prize, and because they don’t carry humans,
they can be produced in large numbers and
much more cheaply than conventional manned
weapons. You could conceive of acquiring
many of them, and because they can
communicate with each other and coordinate
with each other, they can be deployed in
swarms, and spin and weave at machine speed.
How many F-35 fighters can the Pentagon
afford at hundreds of millions of dollars each?
Just a few. How many destroyers can it afford
at $1 billion each? Very few, and they’re not
planning to build many of those anymore.
Instead, they will deploy hundreds or
thousands, maybe tens of thousands of
unmanned drone aircraft, ships, and
submarines.
Michael Klare:

Moreover, these weapons are not drones
operating in a counter-terror environment
where they have total control of the sky, and
they’re hunting individual targets as discussed
in the previous panel. These are intended to
operate in hotly-contested environments
where enemy forces will have jamming
capabilities, and they’re intended to attack
high-value targets such as air defense radars,
early warning systems, airfields, and other very
highly capable systems that are crucial to the
defense of Russia and China. The question is,
in this environment, when you have swarms of
these systems in use, what will be the impact
on the escalatory potential of future conflicts?
That I think is the question that we have to ask.
That’s the ethical and international relations
question that we have to ask.
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The answer, I believe (and I’m very much
influenced by our keynote speaker, Paul
Scharre, in this matter), is it is going to increase
the potential for escalation of conflict to the
nuclear realm. Why? Because if you lose
contact with these systems–and as we’ve been
told, it is entirely possible that in a hotly
contested area it will be increasingly difficult to
retain human communication with them–that
they could go rogue or they’ll continue fighting
even though a political decision may be made
to halt the fighting or to keep it at a limited
level, that these machines will go on attacking
high value systems that are essential to the
defense of these countries and may be seen as
a prelude to a nuclear attack, and therefore
prompt early use of nuclear weapons by an
adversary.
More worrisome still is the possibility that war
planners will conclude that with the
introduction of more capable ICBMs and
SLBMs and bomber planes and missile
defenses that are being conceived, that you can
conceive of a nuclear first strike using swarms
of undersea submarines, like the Orca system
just being funded by the Navy, to attack enemy
missile-carrying submarines, the most safe,
secure, reliable, retaliatory second-strike
system. You could also conceivably use
thousands of drone aircraft to search out and
strike enemy mobile missile systems, which
China and Russia rely on for their retaliatory
capability.
If you can achieve these kinds of attack,
targeting second-strike capabilities, nuclear
stability is out of the window. You can
conceive of a first strike, and even if you are
112
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not contemplating a first strike, if you just have
that capability deployed in a crisis, an enemy
has to assume you’re thinking about it, and if it
sees these swarms coming, you may very well
decide you had better launch your weapons
now before they’re destroyed in the first strike.
It’s this kind of an environment, these kinds of
scenarios that I think we have to worry about
much more. The question of whether a drone
could distinguish a civilian from a combatant is
a moral question, I agree. But even more, I
think, we have to worry about the implications
for the survival of all of us from deploying
these weapons in an environment that’s already
hotly contested, where the risk of escalation is
becoming increasingly great.
Tiya Maluwa:

Thank you, Michael. You have noticed that my
one minute was stretched to three minutes, but
that’s because it’s a very fascinating discussion
and I didn’t really want to cut you short.

Michael Klare:

I apologize.

Tiya Maluwa:

Some of the things that you skipped might
come in at the end during Q&A. Without
further ado, I pass the floor to Charlie.

Charles Dunlap:

Well, thank you very much. I must say, I often
don’t hear a presentation with which I disagree
more, but I’ve heard one. I hope to address a
few of those things, but what I want to do is
maybe take you back and talk about
autonomous weapons in relationship of the
development
of
international
norms.
International norms – as I would use the term
– aren’t necessarily treaties, they aren’t
necessarily customary international law, but
rather they’re more or less voluntary expected
norms. And the way they develop or different
113
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ways they can develop, but at some point you
have to have countries agreeing to them and
following them.
The U.S. has started doing this. If you look at
the original DoD directive that talks about
autonomous weapons, it discusses keeping a
man in the loop, in some way, and what does
that mean? Of course, that’s the devil in the
details because we need to understand the
systems better. I’m not one of the people. I
agree with some of our previous speakers who
would say that we are not going to see a
“Terminator” anytime soon by any country, let
alone the United States. Because I think we
have to understand it’s not just the autonomy
in the system, but it’s also the mechanics that
would go into it. Imagine trying to build a
robot with autonomy, but also with the
hydraulics and everything else: power supply,
and fuel and everything else. We shouldn’t look
at these issues in isolation from other
technologies, because a lot of things now are
getting lumped under autonomy and we
haven’t even really described or settled on an
internationally accepted definition. If I was
looking to develop norms, I would at least try
to agree on a definition.
Charles Dunlap:

Is that going to happen anytime soon? I don’t
think so. Because as many of you know, at the
UN, a Group of Governmental Experts has
been meeting for years and they still haven’t
settled on a definition. Part of the problem –
and where I think we ought to focus on – is
that there’s lots of automated systems. We’ve
heard about them, but I don’t think we should
think about them so much as autonomous
systems. What we ought to focus our energy on
114
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is learning systems, because that is where the real
difficulty comes. Because with automated
systems you can take them out to a range, you
can run scenarios through them until you get
to the point which, what international law
would require, is what a reasonable
commander with the reasonable understanding
of the system would expect, that is, that the use
of the system would not cause, for example,
civilian casualties which are excessive in
relation to the anticipated military gain.
The problem with using fully autonomous
systems is that you have subjective decisions to
be made with respect to targeting. What is
excessive in a particular circumstance? What is
the anticipated military gain? That to me is still
going to be in the mind of the human being for
some time in the future. I often think of the
Inchon landings during Korea. What
autonomous system would have ever decided
that was a good idea because all the analysis
said it was a horrible idea. But MacArthur
thought it was a good idea and it turned out to
be a good idea. There are things that go on in
human mind that will give an asymmetric
advantage to those armed forces that don’t go
fully autonomous.
Charles Dunlap:

We do face threats that we are going to have to
have a lot of autonomy. Cyber is one. When
things are happening so quickly, you’re going
to have to have a system that can respond
almost automatically. But what do you build
into an international norm which would help
you with that? My personal view is, I don’t like
it. I think it’s unwise when we pick out a
particular system and give it its own unique
legal regime, and I think that would be
115
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impossible with autonomy. I think it’s better to
focus on the existing law of war and insist on
adherence to it, rather than trying to throw up
your hands and say, we need something entirely
new.
I think my colleague here, his reference to the
nuclear treaties is a little bit of an illustration of
how difficult it is to have a unique treaty for
just a particular kind of weapon system. When
we talk about the INF, the INF was really a
bilateral treaty between us and Russia. It didn’t
stop China from building those exact kind of
missiles that were prohibited under the treaty.
We have to look at that in the future, because
these systems are coming, they are going to be
available to many militaries.
As other people talk, some of the technology is
off the shelf, but here’s the good news:
autonomy is going to be in every part of our
life. We will have civilian systems, different
kinds of systems that will . . . autonomous cars
and so forth, that will help us develop the
testing processes that we will need to have the
security that these weapons are going to
operate as we intended.
Charles Dunlap:

What is particularly tricky about learning
system, unlike our existing systems where you
normally, you test the weapon, you give it a
review and then you deploy it, and you govern
how it’s used. But with learning machines,
you’re never going to be done testing because
the machine you tested when you first deploy
it will be a little bit different – or a lot different
– from the machine a year down the road or
even less, so we have to look at that. If I was
to look to try to develop international norms, I
116
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would try to develop something . . . What
should the testing protocol be? Who should be
involved with that? And so forth. But I do
think it’s going to be very difficult to develop
norms. This is why the U.S., the UK, and
Russia aren’t even interested in trying to
negotiate a particular treaty with respect to
these kinds of particular weapons, in part,
because they haven’t agreed on the definition.
I think in part they realized that they are going
to be integrated.
Charles Dunlap:

Just a couple more things. Another problem I
have with treaties like we are talking about, if
you focus on a particular system, there’s a
treaty that says it is illegal under international
law to develop a weapon that is intended to
blind combatants. You can develop a weapon
that is intended to incinerate the adversary, but
you just can’t develop one that’s intended to
blind. Why? Because in the 1990s, if you went
to the ICRC website, they say, well, being blind
is like – these are not their words – but in
essence it was like worse than being dead. But
there they captured the technology at a
moment in time, and today as horrific as
blindness would be, it’s better than being dead,
and we’re developing technology to help
people see. That’s the problem with these kinds
of specific treaties.
I agree with my friend here that nuclear
weapons are horrible, and their use would be
horrific. But let’s keep in mind we have never
had a war between two nuclear armed
countries. That is a complete turnaround since
World War II. We have never had that, because
there is an understanding. When I look to the
future, I’m less concerned about nuclear
117
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weapons because, for a variety of reasons, what
we can talk about in the Q&A, and I want some
students to ask questions during Q&A because
I may call on them if they don’t have questions.
But this, I’m more concerned about biological
weapons, I’m more concerned about DNA
based weapons, I’m more concerned about
cyber weapons, because cyber weapons can
have really catastrophic effects. Now we’re
seeing some talk about EMP based weapons.
Charles Dunlap:

I do think that there is a place for norm
building, but we have to look at it rather
modestly, and not try to put these in their own
category, because at least now we have a track
record. We have a history of how we interpret
the international law of war with respect to
weapons. We don’t want to get to the mode
that there’s this whole new system, so
everything goes out the window. In terms of
nuclear command and control, all great.
Technology, not just autonomous technology.
Technology – not just autonomous technology
– always presents challenges for controlling
escalation. Absolutely. But I think that what we
will see in the near term with autonomous
systems is the development of decisionsupport systems, which will be helpful to and
better than a lot of the analog systems that we
depend upon now.
The problem that I see is the relationship
between autonomous systems and the data that
they use to build their decision-making
process. Garbage in, garbage out. I think what
we’re going to really have to focus on the
future is how do we determine what is the
appropriate data, how much data is necessary
to get the results that we want? In this respect,
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ironically, China has an advantage to us,
because they have the ability to coerce a billion
human beings into providing data, which helps
them build algorithms that may be more
predictive than what we would be able to do.
On the other hand, it’s a different culture and
maybe that will make them build algorithms
that are mistaken when they use it to interpret
what we are doing. In other words, there’s a lot
of opportunity here, the devil is in the detail. I
don’t want to take too much time because I
really do want to get to the students’ questions.
Tiya Maluwa:

Thank you Charlie, and talking of China, we
hope that we will be able to reconnect with
Elsa because she intends to talk about China’s
approach to the development of autonomous
systems.

Charles Dunlap:

Believe me, Elsa’s forgotten more than I’ve
ever known. She is the person on this topic.

Tiya Maluwa:

We hope to reconnect with her shortly. Yes,
Richard.

Richard Jordan:

It’s a real privilege to be here amongst so many
distinguished figures. I appreciate the diversity
of the people you have here and being part of
it. What I’m going to talk about is game theory
and autonomous systems. I want to start with
a few common normative concerns about
autonomous systems, and these are familiar to
everyone here in the audience. First, they’re
distant. Second, they often involve civilian
losses. Third, they’re automatic, sometimes
even removing the decision for lethal force.
And finally, they’re abstract: the violence
you’re seeing at best through a screen, at worst
as a few data points or even not at all. This all
119
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leads them to be rather dehumanizing, and
dehumanizing in a particularly insidious way.
Richard Jordan:

I think in today’s modern polarized political
climate, we tend to see “dehumanizing” as
calling the other guy an animal or something
like that. But that’s not the most dangerous
form of dehumanization. Autonomous
systems resemble what Hannah Arendt was
talking about with Eichmann in Jerusalem. She
said, “Eichmann was not Iago and not
Macbeth. Except for an extraordinary diligence
in looking out for his personal advancement,
he had no motives at all. He merely, to put the
matter colloquially, never realized what he was
doing.” The danger here is not that you think
of the other person as subhuman, but that you
don’t think about the other person at all. That’s
the danger that we’re seeing ethically and
normatively with autonomous systems.
But what I also see when I look at this list is
that we faced all of this before. In fact, we
faced it even worse than we’re facing it now—
with nuclear weapons. (They’re becoming a
theme on the panel, right?) Nuclear weapons
aren’t just distant, they’re intercontinental. It’s
as far as you could possibly be. They don’t just
risk civilian casualties: there were debates about
whether they should even target civilians
deliberately. For many people, being automatic
was not a bug, but a feature: an automatic
response was sought because it improves your
bargaining position. They’re not just abstract,
but they’re studied with Game Theory, which
as a branch of mathematics is literally as
abstracted as it is possible to be. The critique
here is that nuclear weapons are also
dehumanizing. In fact, I think they’re probably
120

2020

Autonomous Systems & International Norms

Symposium Issue

more dehumanizing than anything we’ve yet
seen emerge with autonomous systems. That
should be encouraging to us because we’ve made
enormous moral progress in thinking about
nuclear weapons and then cooperating around
them. If we can solve that problem, I think we
can solve the other.
Richard Jordan:

In the rest of these remarks, I want to compare
these two systems and what the development
of international norms around nuclear
weapons can tell us about the potential for
norms around autonomous systems. To do
that, I want to go back to a classic debate
between two Game Theorists in the 1950s and
60s, Thomas Schelling and Anatol Rapoport.
Schelling was an economist with RAND and
instrumental in development of brinkmanship
and other nuclear strategies. Rapoport was a
game theorist in biology, and he was appalled
by the idea that these methods that were being
developed to study life in evolving systems,
were being applied to millions of human beings
and their potential extinction. He argued,
“seduction lurks also in the mental habit of
rational analysis. This analysis requires
detachment,”—and that detachment word
should be setting off alarm bells in all our
heads.
He goes on to say, “one cannot play chess, if
one becomes aware of the pieces as living
souls.” That’s a quotation I think that has
haunted me from the first time I heard it. But
Rapoport lost that debate, and he lost it
decisively, and he lost it for the simple reason
that in fact we do play chess with human
souls—and that is a grim fact but one that’s
necessary to face head on.
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What can Game Theory tell us? Harrison
Wagner says that there are two fundamental
insights from Game Theory. First, the idea of
strategic interdependence, that what I do to
pursue my ends will depend fundamentally on
what you do to pursue your ends, and vice
versa. Second, the idea of multiple equilibria,
that any strategic interaction can end in
multiple ways (or just about any strategic
interaction). To solve the first, you study it
through abstract reason. It’s essentially an
optimization problem. It’s studied through
math.
You solve the second through imagination, if
we may call it that. Through setting yourself in
a culture, through trying to understand the
normative and moral paths that might lead you
from one equilibrium to another. Here I think
you can really see what Rapoport’s mistake
was. He was trying to study the first problem
using the tools of the second. He was trying to
import into what was essentially a cold
calculation, something that didn’t belong there.

Richard Jordan:

Where does moral imagination belong? The
answer seems to be in discriminating between
possible worlds. Asking, which one do we want
to inhabit? How do we get there? The answer
that Schelling came up with, and that was so
persuasive, is this: you look for focal points.
These are points which are—or can be made
to be—psychologically, aesthetically, or
morally appealing. They’re something you
notice and you are drawn to, and they have to
be clear and they have to stand out. They have
to be clear, because you need to be able to
detect cheating. You need to know if
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somebody else is not converging on the same
point as you.
Perhaps even more importantly though, focal
points need to stand out. They need to be axes
about which all of your other normative
expectations can revolve. If we think of focal
points, the solution here is not to change the
weapon, not to try to humanize a
dehumanizing weapon. Rather, we need to
humanize the moral arguments, the moral
narratives we’re constructing around it, and
with nuclear weapons, this looked like the
nuclear taboo.
Schelling dedicated his Nobel acceptance
speech exclusively to the nuclear taboo and its
success in preventing nuclear war over the past
half century. The taboo is the idea that there’s
a qualitative difference between zero and one.
If we’re looking for an equilibrium in which
were going to converge, nonuse is the most
attractive.
Richard Jordan:

It’s become such a part of our culture, such a
part of our moral upbringing, that when I teach
about the nuclear taboo in my introductory
class to the undergrads—most of them have
never even thought about nuclear weapons
before—even though they’d never heard this
phrase, all of them know what it is, and it’s not
surprising to any of them. It’s not surprising
because somehow passively they just absorbed
it in the culture around them, that this is the
expectation, that this is the moral anchor for
how we think about nuclear weapons.
Other famous focal points would include like
the moratorium on whaling. Economically, it’s
suboptimal. We can sustainably fish whales at
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higher rates than zero, but we converged on
zero because it’s simple and clear: save the
whales! It’s very clear to everyone involved and
it’s easy to detect cheating: if one person has
commercially fished whales other than the few
people who aren’t on board with it, you know
somebody broke the rules. Something perhaps
a bit more familiar to a legal audience would be
norms surrounding outer space. In the fifties
and sixties there were debates, should we use
the pattern of airspace or the pattern of the law
of the sea to think about outer space? We really
owe a lot to those early normative
entrepreneurs and legal entrepreneurs who
said, we’d much prefer to live in a world in
which outer space is a global commons, like the
sea, rather than parts of it being the private
property of Russia or America.
Richard Jordan:

What does all that mean for autonomous
systems? What are the focal points for
autonomous systems? I think there is a
challenge here because we don’t have anything
like a nuclear taboo. It’s not going to be zero. I
think we’re going to have to create the focal
points ourselves. That’s a challenge I think for
everyone in this room, especially people who
are thinking creatively about these weapons.
(The way I think the nuclear taboo became
really institutionalized in our culture through
fiction came up during professor Jordan’s talk
earlier today; we need to do something similar
with autonomous systems, and we haven’t
done that yet.)
I do have some suggestions, with just my last
few minutes, of what these need to look like.
The first, is a reminder that a focal point has to
be an equilibrium. It has to be strategically
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rational for the main players. As an aside, I’ve
always found it irksome when people critique
President Obama as the “drone warrior,”
because it’s always seemed to me that particular
policy flows very much from domestic
incentives rather than from personal character.
I think we have to recognize that as long as
certain domestic incentives are pushing actors
in the same direction, then any leader in that
situation is going to take those actions. A total
ban is just not going to be acceptable to
democratic publics. Another point is, if it’s a
winning strategy to make a decision in a
millisecond, it’s rather a moot point about
whether we want to make that decision or not.
It will be made.
Richard Jordan:

Let me turn to my second suggestion. I
couldn’t resist putting a clickbait headline up
here, since we are talking about drones. This
jumped out at me when I saw the Kalashnikov
assault rifle: “now we have Kalashnikov
drones.” (What do you expect from your
Facebook newsfeed, right?) I think there’s a
tendency to focus on trying to solve problems
like the one in this headline because it’s what
draws our attention; it’s what the public is
talking about. But this is really the hardest
possible problem we could set ourselves to
solve. There are literally thousands of actors
involved. State and non-state actors, all with
competing incentives, all from different moral
traditions. If you’re looking for a moral or
aesthetic focal point around which you’re
going to organize, good luck, because I don’t
see it.
But that suggests to me that we should start at
the top. This is a chart taken from a colleague’s
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working paper down at Texas Tech. It plots the
different distributions of drone technologies
for consumers and non-state actors versus
commercial actors versus state actors. Now
drone technology is a continuum, but what I
think this captures is there’s something
approaching a qualitative difference between
the vast bulk of what states are using and
everything else. By being drawn to the problem
that, “oh, we can build these things in our
garages,” we’re missing the easiest places to
begin norm building, which is at the top, where
there’s only a dozen actors need to get on
board and most of our incentives are aligned.
Instead of trying to solve the problem from the
bottom, let’s go to the top of the distribution,
and work our way down.
Richard Jordan:

Third, and this is really driven from the idea of
focal points, is keep it simple. I think especially
because the technology is so fascinating,
especially to people in this room, that it is easy
and it is fun to talk about the ins and outs of
technology; but it’s also really, really confusing
to talk about, and to start trying to draw
distinctions in it, especially to outsiders. I think
we need to set ourselves this aim: that any
president, any congressman, any senator, any
secretary needs to come into office the same
way as my undergraduates come into my class.
They need to know the guiding principles of
how to use autonomous systems without
knowing anything about the technology,
because they just inherited them from the
culture around them. For people to do that, the
principles have to be something really simple
that even, forgive me, that even as senator
could understand. I think that’s what we
should set as our goal.
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I’ll conclude. I think the central question here
is, can we draw clear moral distinctions that
align with our incentives, focused our
cooperation, and by capturing our
imaginations, rehumanize this fundamentally
dehumanizing technology? If that seems like a
tall order, I would just say—we’ve already done
it once. Why can’t we do it again? Thank you.
Tiya Maluwa:

Thank you, Richard. We’ll now try and
reconnect with Elsa.

Elsa Kania:

Okay. I’m glad to be here, at least in spirit and
virtually and I thank you so much for the
invitation to participate in this panel. It’s been
a fascinating conversation so far and I’m
looking forward to your questions and to
continuing the discussion. I’ll provide some
quick perspectives on how I see the Chinese
military exploring the development of the
range of applications of artificial intelligence,
including for autonomous weapon systems.
Then I’ll comment quickly on some of the
emergent legal and normative debates in which
China is taking part, and where I see that going
forward. Please somebody yell if I cut out again
audio wise because I don’t want to be talking
to myself.
Okay, so here we go. I think that it has become
quite clear in the past couple of years that
artificial intelligence is a new frontier for
strategic competition among great powers.
China’s approach to date has been informed by
its close study of initiatives the U.S. third
offset, which provoked a lot of concerns
among Chinese leaders because that was aimed
at reestablishing U.S. operational advantage
relative to China, and that focus on concepts
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like human-machine teaming and learning
autonomous systems, and the notion that
today’s emerging technologies could change
conflict in ways that enable potentially
disruption of the existing balance of power. I
would argue that a lot of those ideas have been
very deeply ingrained into how the Chinese
military thinks about warfare today.
Elsa Kania:

Increasingly, there appears to be a consensus
among Chinese military strategists that we are
in the midst of a continuing revolution in
military affairs. I will note that the notion of an
RMA has some history. It has fallen out of
favor in the U.S., but there has been some
consistency in Chinese military thinking on the
fact that information technology along with
today’s emerging technologies are starting to
transform conflict in ways that may have far
reaching implications. This may be a little bit
jargon-y, but the Chinese military talks about
today’s work there as informatized and the
military strategic guideline focuses on fighting
and winning and informatized wars within the
region. Increasingly, the notion is that warfare
is becoming intelligentized or smartified you
could say, but that sounds a little bit less
serious, and that AI is really going to be
pervasive across all aspects of military power
for a range of capabilities.
I think when we talk about norms, when we
talk about some of the legal considerations, I
think it’s important to keep in mind this
backdrop of fairly intense military competition.
There is a lot of talk these days that we are in a
new era of great power rivalry. I would argue,
in some respects, there is more continuity than
change, because the Chinese military has been
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looking at the U.S. as both a teacher and also
as a target of their development since at least
the 1990s. I think across the range of
applications today, some do involve
autonomous systems including swarming
drones and those varying degrees of autonomy.
Elsa Kania:

I happened to be walking through China’s
military museum in Beijing a few summers ago
and saw a small exhibit on future warfare that
had a depiction of a swarm combat system
going up against an aircraft carrier. Although
they did not specify whose aircraft carrier
might be the intended target of such swarms, I
think then we can luckily come to some
conclusions there. I think that the Chinese
military appears to be thinking fairly
asymmetrically about how they can leverage
these capabilities in fighting a more powerful
adversary, which is how they tend to see the
United States. I think it is far too soon to say
which military will ultimately be advantaged by
these developments. I would also add that AI
is not a singular technology, but a range of
techniques that have quite multifaceted
applications, some of which are more
concerning than others. For instance, I do
believe that the introduction of greater
autonomy into cyber defense and automated
offensive operations in cyberspace could pose
a major concern in terms of escalation or a
momentum driven conflict emerging in that
domain. When we think about some of the
advances in autonomy and cruise missiles, even
hypersonic glide vehicles that China is
pursuing, some of that may be incremental in
nature.
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But in other respects, when you start to
combine the speed and increased capability and
precision of these weapon systems across the
board, it does start to become more significant
as perhaps enabling changes in the military
balance, or conduct of operations going
forward. There appears to be a consistent
theme in Chinese military writings—although I
will note that to my knowledge, the Chinese
military does not have an official policy on
autonomy yet to date—the notion that given
these advances and artificial intelligence and
autonomy, the tempo of operations will
increase progressively. Eventually there will be
a point where humans can no longer remain
fully in the loop, and instead we’ll have to be
on the loop or even out of the loop at a certain
point in time. There is intense attention to the
notion of AI and decision support, particularly
to improve commander’s decision-making
capabilities.
Although herein otherwise, but in some
respects, the PLA’s approach to AI may be
informed by self-diagnosis of their weaknesses.
For instance, Chinese military leaders have
complained that they believe their
commanders are not capable of making good
decisions, evaluating the situation and
executing orders well. Just as AI could be one
response to that, organizationally in a sense, or
the notion that introducing AI for decision
support could augment a commander’s
capabilities and will also increase the speed and
efficiency of commanding control including
through data fusion and integration of
information on the battlefield. Though of
course, I think the tendency of bureaucracies
and organizations towards stove piping and the
130

2020

Autonomous Systems & International Norms

Symposium Issue

challenges of managing military data, which
quite often is data that is relevant, is often quite
distinct from the data that is more prevalent in
the commercial ecosystem. I think a lot of
these factors could be challenges and
impediments in the near term.
Elsa Kania:

As I mentioned, the Chinese military does not
yet have a formal policy on how they will
approach questions of autonomy, or at least if
they have, they have not released it or been
transparent about it. I hope that at some point
they might, but at least so far there has not.
There does seem to be some awareness of the
challenges of testing, but I have seen less
discussion than I would hope to see about
some of the reasons for concern about the
vulnerability
and
unpredictability
of
autonomous weapon systems. For instance, as
we saw with my own technical difficulties at the
start, technology can be unreliable at times,
whether for reasons of connectivity or a
human error in some cases, or the human
machine interface. One question I would raise
that I am not sure we have a full visibility on is
whether the PLA, the Chinese military, may be
too enthusiastic about some of these
capabilities and not realistic enough in their
awareness of some of the shortcomings in
operating under real world conditions,
including because they lack recent experience
in combat.

Elsa Kania:

The Chinese military has not fought a war since
they fought Vietnam in 1979. They are trying
to improve training and realism, including
through war gaming. We’re getting that this
involves AI in some cases. But that is not a
substitute for the harsh lessons of actual
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operational experience, I would argue. There
could be perhaps an overconfidence there that
could prove dangerous or concerning. With
regard to China’s engagement in diplomatic
forums so far at the United Nation Group of
government experts on lethal autonomous
weapons systems, China’s position has evolved
and has been a little bit peculiar at times. About
a year ago, China’s delegation came out in favor
of a ban on the use, and not development, of
fully autonomous weapon systems. However,
the definition that they described in their
working paper at the time appeared to exclude
everything that the Chinese military and
defense industry were interested in or already
developing. They defined a fully autonomous
weapon as one that had no human control at
any stage in the process, no option of
termination ones that had been launched, and
was entirely in discriminant.
No professional military would want a weapon
that is indiscriminate. That defeats the purpose.
If you are fighting a major adversary, you want
to be sure your weapon will function as
intended, and essentially that support for
advancing have been somewhat symbolic and
some would characterize it as a legal warfare or
law fare of sorts. Tactic to take common cause
with activists pushing for a ban which could
prove unrealistic, well framing it in a way that
would not constrain their own developments.
From what I’ve heard at the UNGG this year,
China was rather quiet and reaffirmed some of
these positions because I’d really moving the
conversation forward. But it will be interesting
to see if the Chinese government does start to
become more engaged in these forums going
forward.
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Elsa Kania:

It is worth noting that China’s new generation
AI development plan launched in December of
2017 does talk about China playing a greater
role in leading in the global governance of AI,
including developing a legal, ethical and
normative frameworks. I think that’s
encouraging, but I would note that the ethics
and norms that are prioritized in China by the
Chinese government may be different from
those that we’d see in debates in the U.S. and
even if Chinese companies or engineers may
care on a personal basis about privacy and
personal freedoms and the Chinese
government clearly has a strong interest in
access to data and surveillance that may
override any resistance though there has been
some pushback at times.

Elsa Kania:

I think China, as of this spring, the Chinese
government has set up a new commission to
think through issues of ethics, law and
regulation for autonomous systems. It’d be
interesting to see what comes out of there.
There has been some talk by Chinese military
strategists and scholars about concerns over an
AI arms race and options for arms control.
Although I think mechanisms that are feasible
may prove challenging or perhaps unrealistic.
To conclude, since I think I am getting near to
the end of my time, I’ll tell you that I think
going forward as we think about norms, we
have to keep in mind the reality of this
competition and the intense security dilemma
that is exacerbated by uncertainties over the
status of developments. Arguably the U.S. and
China tend to overestimate or exaggerate in
some cases, each other’s capabilities. There’s
some amount of propaganda and perhaps
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information in Chinese reporting on what
they’ve accomplished. For instance, claiming to
have a world record in swarms of drones and
to have beaten us records. Size does not matter
most in this context necessarily, and a large
swarm does not necessarily mean it’s the most
sophisticated in terms of algorithms. I think
definitely some propaganda or oneupsmanship there. But I think given this
competition, I think it will be important to
think very pragmatically about where the U.S.,
China and Russia have alignment of interests,
and I would argue that in risk mitigation, and
that could include the options for testing,
verification, fail safes, sharing of best practices.
Hopefully there will be some opportunities for
dialogues among great powers on these issues
going forward because I think the risks to
strategic stability, including because the nexus
of AI nuclear weapons even simply in early
warning does seem concerning. I think it will
be really valuable to try to engage among
competitors to see if there are pragmatic
measures that all could agree upon would be a
favorable path forward. I will stop there. I hope
you could hear me fairly well for most of the
time. Hopefully I’ve not just been talking to
myself and I will look forward to your
questions and conversation.
Tiya Maluwa:

Thank you, Elsa. We heard you very well, and
we have just under fifteen minutes for
questions. I would like to encourage anybody
who has a question or comment to step up to
the mics on the right or left, and bear in mind
the invitation that was issued particularly to
students. So, please.
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Audience:

Hi. I welcome you all here. I’ve noticed just
through my own research and the
conversation, there’s a huge emphasis on
humanitarian law with autonomous weapons
systems. I was wondering, especially in light of
increased use of autonomous systems in
domestic law enforcement if we need to, or the
international community needs to address
human rights norms or human rights
implications with autonomous weapon
systems?

Charles Dunlap:

Oh, I’ll take a quick stab at that. I think you’re
onto something. I’m not a big fan of
international human rights law in the context
of armed conflict, but it does have a place. I’m
particularly concerned about how you build the
algorithm and do you build in biases when you
build the algorithm? Also, where do you take
the data to build the algorithm? Or to fuel the
algorithm so to speak. I think that that has a lot
of implications for international human rights
law. I think that we need to think about what
kind of data are we about, individuals, for
example, are we going to permit into the
system? That’s only scratching the surface. I
don’t know if anybody . . . But you’re onto
something.

Audience:

Okay.

Charles Dunlap:

Keep working on it, because there is a lot of
discussion . . . the whole predictive sentencing
phenomena in criminal trials, predictive law
enforcement. It all sounds good. But in the
end, and especially if you have a learning
system where you start out with bad, with say,
biased data, it’s only going to get more . . . it
has some potential to get more biased and
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more unfair, and that’s particularly something
that, that you ought to be concerned about in
that context.
Audience:

Thank you.

Tiya Maluwa:

Thank you. Chuck.

Chuck Diebel:

Thank you panelists for being here. I’m Chuck
Diebel, a third-year joint degree student here.
A lot of talk about fitting new technologies into
new legal regimes, new arms control
agreements and treaties. My question is about
countries pushing back against current
international norms in new domains, cyber and
space. What the United States can do in
ensuring that the liberal order that’s been
created since World War II is sustained, and
not necessarily focusing on a specific
technology, but how to fit the current
technologies in the current legal norms and
ensuring that those norms are complied with.

Charles Dunlap:

Actions speak louder than words. That’s why I
think that what the administration did to
Internet Research Agency, right before the
2018 election, it at least established that you
can’t interfere with U.S. elections and suffer
nothing for it. The other thing that I think our
government needs to do more is we need more
opinio juris. In other words, if you look in
particular, I’m thinking the cyber domain is it’s
a little bit amorphous, we have the Harold Koh
speech, we have a chapter in the DoD Law of
War Manual, but we get sometimes
inconsistent messages. I think that’s a big part
of it.

Charles Dunlap:

But you’re exactly right. In the cyber area,
China has said, “we don’t think the law of
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armed conflict applies.” We have to push back
on that if we want to have norms, but there has
to be some consequences. That’s one reason
why people say, “Oh, the indictments didn’t do
much with Internet Research Agency, it’s just a
couple guys.” It really starts to lay down a
marker, but we have to do it in other areas and
including with respect to autonomous
weapons.
I think that is what we ought to do especially
as we look for law development. I think there
are a lot of good ideas. But also in the testing
and approval of a weapon prior to its
deployment. There are things in the existing
Geneva Conventions, and Protocol I that
speak to that. But I think there are only like
twelve or fourteen nations among the hundred
and some signatories who actually do weapons
reviews and testing before they buy them or
field them.
Michael Klare:

I think you raised a good question. I do
represent something called the Arms Control
Association, which is a non-nonpartisan
organization. But our goal is to, as best as
possible, to advocate for and promote
disarmament and nuclear stability through
international agreements. That’s where we
come from, and as an organization, we heavily
supported the Iranian nuclear deal, the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action which we
thought was a very important step towards
nuclear nonproliferation. We are very
distressed by the administration’s decision to
withdraw from that. We hope that there will be
a way to preserve that treaty or to restore that
agreement down the road. We’re very
distressed by claims that Russia has violated the
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INF Treaty. But we don’t think that
withdrawing from it was the right way to
approach that problem. Rather, there should
be more consultations, more effort to resolve
the question of Russian violations, and see if
there’s a way to resolve them without breaking
out of the treaty.
Michael Klare:

I agreed with my colleague that China is not a
member of the treaty and has pursued weapons
which are dangerous. In addressing this
problem, we should be working with Russia
through a strategic dialogue to try to persuade
China to enter into discussions to try to impose
some kinds of limits on these weapons.
Instead, the U.S. is now pursuing INFnoncompliant weapons which will put Russia’s
and China’s command and control facilities at
risk. Russia has said it will do the same, so we
will be in a much more dangerous
environment. My colleague here from Baylor
said there is a nuclear taboo, but that doesn’t
last forever. These agreements and
commitments to controls on nuclear weapons
were intended to buttress the taboo by making
the onset of nuclear war harder.

Michael Klare:

Yet, everything that I was talking about earlier
was to show how those controls are being
undermined and how all remaining arms
control agreements are now at risk, including
the New START Treaty, which could also be
terminated. All of those were intended to
protect the taboo by making it physically hard
to start a nuclear war. Well, all of those are
being eroded, and so whether or not the taboo
remains intact is in doubt when the
mechanisms in place to preserve it are at risk.
Where autonomous weapons fit in, that is what
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I was trying to get at, and my concern is that
they are increasing the risk. I do think that
there are mechanisms, some of which have
been discussed, that could diminish the risk
that autonomous weapons, if fielded, would
play that destabilizing role, and we can talk
about that.
Charles Dunlap:

Well, number one, we’ve always tried to put
enemies’ command and control systems in at
risk, so that’s nothing new. Secondly, the Iran
agreement was going to run out. I mean, it
wasn’t a permanent fix. Then thirdly, I
question the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty as it
raises moral questions of exactly the opposite.
In other words, I think adherence to it raises
moral questions and I just invite people to take
a look at an article I wrote on War on the
Rocks. It’s called “Is a Nuclear Weapon Ban
Treaty and Moral,” and just make your own
judgment.

Tiya Maluwa:

Right. We do have four people lined up who’ll
ask questions, but before we do that, can I just
pass the flow to Elsa? I’m informed she wants
to come in, and then I’ll come to you.

Elsa Kania:

Oh, sure. I was just going to respond to an
earlier point about some of the norms and
considerations for human rights in play.
Because I wanted to highlight that what scares
me most about what China is doing in AI is not
the weapon systems but the ways in which
these technologies can be leveraged to increase
the course of capability of the state, including
for surveillance and censorship. I think the
situation in Xingjiang today, which is
absolutely and just beyond the pollen with the
intense repression and detention of by some
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estimates up to a million Weekers. If anyone
saw the New York Times earlier this week a
feature on how cities are essentially being
turned into Open Air prisons, with pervasive
surveillance and very granular monitoring of
individuals for anything that is seen as an
indication of what they’re calling terrorism. But
essentially this has often been characterized as
a cultural genocide against minority population
in China.
Elsa Kania:

I think some of these tools are being
experimented with in Xingjiang, and
companies are making a lot of money in the
process, including some like iFLYTEK and
SenseTime and at some point some American
companies have been suppliers so that does
put some ethical questions in that context as
well. But I think that these capabilities can have
the potential for abuse and democracies or an
authoritarian regimes. But I think the damage
can be graver when there are protections and
the freedom to have a full ethical debate. I
think we should expect to see these capabilities
diffusing or proliferating, including again,
because of the profit mode. But a lot of
companies can make a lot of money selling
tools for surveillance and particularly
leveraging facial recognition. Chinese
companies are already increasingly providing
this to other governments, including those of
either shakily democratic or outright
authoritarian, have recently an agreement in
Zimbabwe, new partnerships in Malaysia and
Singapore. Have programs in smart cities and
facial recognition for urban environments that
. . . and I think the aggregate impact of this
could be to really challenge the future of
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democratic governance in quite far reaching
and troubling ways.
Elsa Kania:

I do think that it’s really an urgent question and
there’s been some talk of sanctioning Chinese
companies that are involved in some of . . .
involved or complicit in some of these
activities including those that have a presence
or activities in the U.S. I think from the . . . I’m
not a lawyer I will say, but I think a lot of legal
and normative questions too, and I don’t have
any good answers myself, but I do think it’s
something for all of us to consider of how do
we think about the threat that these
technologies may pose to democracy? And
how we can start early and trying to really
explore new and hopefully creative solutions to
make sure that these technologies will be
accountable. I think that does start in some of
our own debates about how we’re using AI and
policing and Homeland Security, but also does
extend to these international considerations as
well.

Tiya Maluwa:

Thank you. We have one minute, but I’m going
to do the unthinkable, which is to take up five
minutes of your lunch time because I don’t
want to lose the questions here. I would only
ask that you keep the questions short, the
answers short, and if by any chance the
preceding question covers what you wanted to
ask, feel free to pass up your chance. But
Richard wanted to react very quickly, please.

Richard Jordan:

Very quickly. I’ll try to keep just three points to
the gentleman’s question earlier. First, I’d say
that the benefit of norms as opposed to law is
that they are flexible and evolve. I think we
should not only understand, but expect that
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these things will change over time. Second, a
lot of these norms were articulated during
either the Cold War or during the 90s or 2000s,
during the unipolar moment. The world is very
different. It’s going to be very different, so we
should expect that these norms will change. On
the plus side, I don’t think autonomous
systems will be driving that change, except
insofar as they disproportionately benefit
revisionist powers, as they disproportionately
shift the balance of power. But the third and
perhaps the most important point is that as we
adjust the secondary, the buttressing
institutions (like the INF), you’ve got to leave
the underlying norms in place. Similarly, as
you’re adjusting nuclear arms control
agreements, you’ve got to leave the nuclear
taboo in place, and not just leave it in place but
reaffirm it. Because those sorts of norms take
50 years to establish, and they’re lost very
easily, and they’re very hard to replace. So while
we should accept evolutionary change, we need
to hold the fundamentals in place.
Tiya Maluwa:

Thank you. Please.

Audience:

Yeah. I’ll try to be quick. In terms of thinking
about the distinctions between norms and
treaties and laws, is there anything that we
might be able to learn for this domain from the
very successful establishment of a norm against
human cloning without having to have any
treaties? That’s a case where there was a very
rapid establishment of a norm. To the best of
our knowledge, it actually hasn’t yet been
violated. But without any treaties. Can we learn
anything from that domain and case study that
might be useful over in this one or are they just
too far distinct from one another?
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Charles Dunlap:

I would just, I’m guessing here is, I think they
are two distinct, because there’s so many uses
of autonomy in other areas of society, by
cloning is a narrower topic. Perhaps it’s easier
to wrap your arms around it, whereas here, and
we at least we can define what it is. We’re still
struggling with exactly what we mean by
autonomy, fully autonomous machine learning
and so forth. I think we need to look at that.
That’s a great idea, by the way. But I don’t
know if it is going to be the template, but might
be a piece of the template.

Tiya Maluwa:

Thank you.

Audience:

This is for Dr. Jordan and Dr. Kania. Given
that asymmetric trying to get an asymmetric
technology advantage, what does that
deterrence look like in the South China Sea to
get freedom of navigation, trade, selfdetermination?

Michael Klare:

Could you repeat that please?

Audience:

Okay. Basically how do you deter, how do
these technologies, given the Chinese have a
very aggressive stance of the South China Sea
and these technologies seem to want to give
you a little bit of an edge. How do you model
a deterrent strategy for that?

Richard Jordan:

The same question.

Tiya Maluwa:

Thank you. Elsa I hope you heard the question
because you might want to come in on that as
well. True?

Elsa Kania:

Well, firstly to clarify I am not a doctor. I have
a long path before I can be Dr. Kania. But for
the time being, I’ll say, I think that’s a great
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question and a difficult one, because there
aren’t easy answers. I worry we missed our
window of opportunity in the South China Sea
and that a failure to push back forcefully earlier
before China had made the militarization of
these features, stocks and the water was really
a last chance to try to nip this in the butt so to
speak. I think now, unfortunately there is a new
status quo and I think we are likely to continue
to see militarization of these features. I know
there’s some debate as to whether these will
alter the military balance in the South China
Sea or prove less impactful given potentially
some of their vulnerabilities. But at the very
least this has enabled more placement of radars
and weapons systems and does start to
reinforce Chinese sea control in the South
China Sea in conjunction with the autonomous
and unmanned undersea systems that could be
used to detect American submarines.
That’s the problem side of things. In terms of
as solutions, I think for . . . this won’t be quite
an answer to your question, but I think for
deterrence, vis a vis China, we first have to
evaluate what our own priorities are. For
instance, if maintaining U.S. access to the
South China Sea is a core priority, then we
might have to be willing to accept a higher level
of risk or, but again, I do think that the status
quo was fairly locked in there. I think word
deterrence will be a major challenge and
concern going forward, that relates to the
South China Sea will be Taiwan. I think the
question of would the U.S. support and defend
Taiwan? And how would some of the weapons
systems we’re talking about, including old
fighter jets, converted into kamikaze drones
that could be used against Taiwan’s air
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defenses, how could those factor in? I think
part of this will depend on politics and
perceptions, because many Americans do
question whether the U.S. can and should
defend Taiwan. China certainly has an interest
in that uncertainty or that uncertainty could
also engender miscalculation.
Elsa Kania:

Again, I know we’re short on time and I don’t
have a good answer here, but I do think that
we will see autonomous systems become a
major feature of some of these disputes and
flashpoints in the region, including increased
use of drones by China to establish persistent
presence or improve their domain awareness in
the Eastern South China seas. I think U.S.
solutions have to first depend upon a political
question of, where our red lines are for sure
and what level of risk we’re willing to accept if
we decide we want to change the status quo?
Which will be a matter of compelling at this
point because the window for deterrence is
passed, at least in the South China Sea.

Tiya Maluwa:

Thank you very much. Richard.

Richard Jordan:

Very quickly, I think I’m going to build on to
comments that have come from earlier on the
panel. First, I think that deterrence against
China is going to differ fundamentally from
how you come to terms against a non-state
actor or even a rogue state, and that’s because
it’s always in the shadow of nuclear power.
That is, as strange and unusual as autonomous
systems are, they’re not going to change the
fact that what we’re most worried about is
escalation. I think that the opportunities for
peace are actually promising because we’re
bargaining in the shadow of that unspeakable,
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horrific event, and that’s always going to be
what’s in the back of people’s minds. It’s going
to be a game of brinkmanship, and gradually
ratcheting up the risk of disaster on both sides.
Not actually, I think, fighting with most of
these weapons. If it comes to that, we’ve
crossed a line from which, well there’s almost
no going back.
Unfortunately, I’m going to use the general’s
comment to undermine his critique a little bit
of Dr. Klare, which is, I think that we have to
accept that the risk the nuclear war is going to
increase. Since we are playing a game of
brinkmanship as the only viable deterrent
strategy in the South China Sea, we have to
accept that the risk of nuclear war, it’s going to
ratchet up from 0.1% 0.5% or something like
that.
Tiya Maluwa:

Thank you. We will take the last two questions
one after the other and then the panelists can
decide which one they want to take on. So, you
go first.

Audience:

I’ve heard a lot of the panelists talk about
accountability today and I think that is
probably a biggest concern for the regular
American about economy and autonomous
citizens. I was wondering your thoughts as
humans probably isolate, you’d be moved out
of the loop on those decision making, how we
account for accountability in that, and how well
the international system currently can address
those concerns?

Tiya Maluwa:

Thank you. Sir.

Audience:

I was wondering about the depersonalization
effects of warfare because of autonomous
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weaponry. You mentioned that that’s a
common fact between, well that and nuclear
warfare, but the core difference is, we all seem
afraid of nuclear warfare, whereas autonomous
weapons seem to make it easier for us to fight
without guilt or much thought of what’s
happening on the battlefield. I was wondering
how those threats and the risk of escalation
compares because of that?
Richard Jordan:

To this quick question, I think the distinction
between them is not as sharp as it might
appear. One of the common critiques of
someone like Herman Kahn in the fifties and
sixties was that these people were
contemplating the deaths of millions and
millions and were almost gleeful in the fact,
because it was so depersonalized for them. I
think it’s become very personal to us because
we’ve been surrounded by fictional narratives
that have made it more personal for us. If I
asked you to visualize a nuclear war, you
probably don’t visualize a picture of the
bombing of Hiroshima. You probably visualize
Dr. Strangelove or if you’re a Millennial of
some dystopian landscape from a bad teen
novel. That’s what made it real to us. (Sorry,
that’s kind of a flippant comment). It’s made it
real to us in a way that no one has done that yet
for drones. No one hasn’t done that yet for
autonomous systems, and I think in 20 years
we’ll have the same kind of perspective as we
have now on nuclear weapons.

Tiya Maluwa:

And question two?

Charles Dunlap:

Well, I was going to say one thing about both
of them.

Tiya Maluwa:

Yeah.
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I think autonomy is going to allow not only the
depersonalization of war, but the hyperpersonalization of war because it’ll enable
adversaries go after very specific individuals
and to collapse organizations by pulling point
out specific capabilities. Regarding your
question, I think accountability in the law of
war sense in the international law sense,
number one, command accountability has not
been that good. We just had the Bemba case
and that was a pretty clear one. It just was
reversed by the ICC. I think that it’s going to
come down to the commander. The
commander is going to be responsible. Ergo,
the individual commander, he or she is going
to have to have a reasonable understanding of
the system. This is why that discussion earlier
about explainable AI is critical to the ability to
field these weapons and to hold people
accountable.
I think that is where the focus is going to be.
People talk about whether the computer
manufacturer or the software writer would be
liable. No. I mean, if he’s a rogue and puts
something deliberately malicious in there, but
not just in the way that the weapon comes out.
I’ve written a piece on that, I’ll send it to you.
Good question.

Michael Klare:

Can I just say one thing? This is not exactly on
this topic, but I began my presentation by
emphasizing the shift in the international
political environment that we’re in. Sometimes
spending time in Washington helps with this.
That for many people in Washington and
Moscow and Beijing, it is evident that we’ve
moved into an era of great power competition
and conflict. The military leadership and the
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political leadership sees this more intense
competitive environment, in which war is a
very realistic possibility among the great
powers, and that technology is making it
possible to conceive of attacks on, as you say,
not just on individuals, but on the leadership.
President Putin in his speech a few weeks ago
specifically said that, if the U.S. deploys
weapons in Europe of the type that are banned
by the INF Treaty, Russia will respond by
deploying weapons off the coast of the United
States intended to attack the command
capacity, meaning the president of the United
States and other leaders of the U.S. There is a
more intense competitive environment in
which the national leadership sees war as a very
real possibility, and it’s in that environment
that all of these developments have to be
viewed.
Tiya Maluwa:

Yeah. Thank you very much. We are running
out of time, hopelessly. We should continue
the conversation over lunch, I hope. But could
you just join me in thanking our panelists for
their very enriching presentations.
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